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VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: THE CHILDREN AREN’T REAL, BUT THE DANGERS ARE;
WHY THE ASHCROFT COURT GOT IT WRONG
I. INTRODUCTION
One need not look any further than the items in his own home to realize how much
technology has progressed in the last two decades. In the world of televisions we have gone
from the 1991 Zenith Advanced System 3 to now fifty plus inch high definition and 3D liquid
crystal display (LCD) televisions. In video gaming we have progressed from the pixilated
images in Sega Genesis and Nintendo to the XBOX360 and PlayStation3, with games such as
Call of Duty and Madden NFL using motion-capture technology and state-of-the-art CGI
technology to give us the most life-like humans to date. In Hollywood you have movies, such as
this summer’s blockbuster Rise of the Planet of the Apes, which used “CGI technology to create
what looks to be the most realistic depiction yet of a humanised ape.”1 As technology has
progressed, we are rapidly approaching a point, if not already there, where virtual images and
videos are nearly indistinguishable from their real-life counterparts. In the realm of child
pornography, this poses a dangerous and difficult problem. In the nine years since Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition we have gotten to a point where virtual child pornography can pose just as
much harm to children as actual child pornography. Though virtual child pornography does not
entail the abuse of real children, real children can still be victims. Because of the indirect harm
to children that virtual child pornography causes, there are legitimate and compelling State
interests in classifying virtual child pornography as a category of material wholly outside the
protection of the First Amendment.

1

Graham Smith, Fans Go Bananas for New Planet Of The Apes Trailer Which Takes Humanised Monkey Effects to
a Whole New Level, MAIL ONLINE (April, 14 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1376448/RiseOf-The-Planet-Of-The-Apes-Fans-bananas-new-clip.html.
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This paper will first discuss the compelling State interests for prohibiting actual child
pornography, as discussed in New York. v. Ferber. Next it will discuss the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 and how it was found unconstitutional by the Court in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition. Part four will explain why the Court in Ashcroft got it wrong, and part five
will give an alternative means of combating virtual child pornography under the analysis in
Brandenburg v. Ohio. Finally part six will address the aftermath of Ashcroft, Congress’ passing
of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, and the case that sustained it, United States v. Williams.
II. NEW YORK V. FERBER
The first case to tackle the issue of actual child pornography was New York v. Ferber.
Ferber dealt with a New York statute that prohibited a person from “knowingly promoting a
sexual performance by a child under the age of 16 by distributing material which depicts such a
performance.”2 In holding that the statute did not violate the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court offered five reasons why the States were entitled to greater freedom in regulating child
pornography.3
A. Compelling State Interests
First and foremost, the State has a “compelling” interest in “safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor.”4 After reviewing the legislative findings that
accompanied the passage of the statute, the Court found that preventing the sexual exploitation
and abuse of children “constituted a government objective of surpassing importance.”5 In
passing the statute, the legislature found that using children as subjects in pornographic materials

2

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 747 (1982).
See id. at 756.
4
Id. at 757.
5
Id.
3

2

was harmful to the emotional, physiological, and mental health of the children used in the
production.6 When children are sexually exploited, studies haves shown that they tend to be
unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships later on in life, to become sexual abusers in
adulthood, and to have a variety of sexual dysfunctions.7 These children are predisposed to selfdestructive behavior such as drug and alcohol abuse or prostitution. In other words, being
subjects of pornographic productions is both harmful to the children and to society as a whole.8
Therefore, as the legislature in NY found, the care of children, being a sacred trust, should not be
abused by profit-seeking persons through a commercial network based on sexual exploitation of
children, and for that reason the “public policy of the state demand[ed] the protection of children
from exploitation through sexual performances.”9 The Court referred to its decision in Prince v.
Massachusetts, saying that a “democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,”10 and stated that as a result
“we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of
youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected
rights.”11 After mentioning that virtually all the States had passed legislation combating child
pornography, the Court found that the regulation of child pornography “easily passes muster
under the First Amendment.”12

6

See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
See id. (citing Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J.AM.ACAD.CHILD PSYCHIATRY
289, 296 (1980)).
8
See id.
9
Id. at 757.
10
Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, (1944)).
11
Id.
12
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
7

3

Second, the government has an interest in “closing the distribution network and drying up
the market for child pornography.”13 The Court found the distribution of child pornography to
be “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways.14 “First, the
materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the
child is exacerbated by their circulation.”15 Pornography actually poses a greater threat to the
child than does sexual abuse because of the fact that the misdeed is recorded and thus can haunt
the child in future years, long after it originally took place.16 The child victim is most harmed by
the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping what happened a secret and it is this knowledge
of publication that “increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.”17 Secondly
“the distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material
which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.”18 It is nearly
impossible to stop the progress of the exploitation of children by only going after the people who
produce it.19 As Charles Rembar said during the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of
the House Judiciary Committee in 1977, “it is an impossible prosecutorial job to try and get at
the acts themselves.”20 Although the production of these materials is a low-profile, clandestine
industry, “the need to market the resulting products requires a visible apparatus of
distribution.”21 Therefore, “[t]he most expeditious if not the only practical method of law
enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties

13

Shepard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L.
& POL'Y 1, 6 (2007) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760).
14
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
15
Id.
16
See id. at 760 (citing Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST
L.REV. 535, 545 (1981)).
17
Id. at 760.
18
Id. at 759.
19
See id. at 760.
20
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760
21
Id.
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on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.”22 The Court compared
child pornography with materials that are legally obscene under the Miller test23, and said that
while “some States may find that this approach properly accommodates its interests, it does not
follow that the First Amendment prohibits a State from going further.”24 The Court reasoned
that the State has a “more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual
exploitation of children,” and thus, the standard adopted under Miller “bears no connection to the
issue of whether a child has been physically harmed or psychologically harmed in the production
of the work.”25 The Court was not convinced that the Miller standard was a satisfactory solution
to the problem of child pornography, so, for example, a sexually explicit depiction of a real child
need not be “patently offensive” in order to be prohibited. Again, “a work which, taken on the
whole, contains serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value may nevertheless embody
the hardest core of child pornography.”26 The Court found that it “is irrelevant to the child [who
has been abused] whether or not the material . . . has a literary, artistic, political or social
value.”27
For its third reason, the Court said that “the advertising and selling of child pornography
provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials,
an activity illegal throughout the Nation.”28 In other words, the selling of child pornography is
inherently linked with the production of child pornography, an activity that is illegal due to the

22

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.
“Today we would add a new three-pronged test: ‘(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.’” Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973).
24
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760-61.
25
Id. at 761.
26
Id.
27
Id. (citing Memorandum from Assemblyman Lasher in Support of N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15 (McKinney 2006)).
28
Id.
23
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numerous statutes that were in place that outlawed the employment of children in these kinds of
films and photographs. The Court referred to Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., saying that
it has rarely “been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends to
immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute.”29 Therefore, if the constitutional freedom for speech and press did not extend to the
production of child pornography, it certainly would not extend to the advertising and selling of
child pornography.
The Court’s fourth reason for why the States were entitled to greater freedom in
regulating child pornography was that the “value of permitting live performances and
photographic reproductions” of minors engaged in sexual conduct “is exceedingly modest, if not
de minimis,” and therefore considered it unlikely that child pornography “would often constitute
an important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work.”30
As for the fifth reason, the Court found that “recognizing and classifying child
pornography as a category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment is not,
incompatible with our earlier decisions.”31 Child pornography “bears so heavily and pervasively
on the welfare of children engaged in its production,” and is therefore “without the protection of
the First Amendment.”32 As Justice Stevens said in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
“[t]he question whether speech is, or is not protected by the First Amendment often depends on
the content of speech,” and “it is the content of [an] utterance that determines whether it is a
protected epithet or an unprotected ‘fighting comment.’”33 When it comes to content-based
classifications, such as child pornography, the Court found that often times those classifications
29

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
Id. at 762-63.
31
Id. at 763.
32
Liu, supra note 13, at 7 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763).
33
Young v. American Mini Theatre, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)
30
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have “been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the
given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”34 In other
words, child pornography is so repugnant that it significantly outweighs any expressive interests
that may come from it, and therefore a bright-line rule prohibiting it is more appropriate than
requiring a case-by-case analysis. “For child pornography, ‘the balance of competing interests is
clearly struck . . . and it is permissible to consider’ it unprotected.”35
B. Direct Harm v. Indirect Harm
The Court in Ferber discussed two types of harms that were caused by actual child
pornography. There was the “direct harm” to the actual children who were the subjects of the
child pornographic materials. “This harm to their physical, physiological, mental, psychological,
and emotional well being is brutish and pervasive,” and “this harm also includes the additional
trauma caused to these children when the pornographic materials are advertised, distributed, and
circulated.”36 There was also an “indirect harm” that the Court spoke of. Pedophiles often will
use child pornography to exploit and abuse other children. In enacting certain child pornography
statutes, Congress found that child pornography often was used by pedophiles to stimulate and
whet their own sexual appetites, and furthermore they would often use it to seduce other children
into sexual activity.37 “[A] child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to
pose for sexually explicit photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing depictions of
other children ‘having fun’ participating in such activity.”38 Often times, “one child’s
memorialized incident of sexual abuse is . . . used to victimize additional children in the
34

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
Liu, supra note 13, at 8 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764).
36
Id.
37
See Congressional Findings (3), (4), Pub. L. 104-208, notes following 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251.
38
Id.
35
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future.”39 Therefore the creation and distribution of child pornography not only directly harms
the subjects of those materials, but it promotes the infliction of indirect harm on new victims;
this harm is facilitated by the network that is the market for child pornography.40
C. Indirect Harm: The Link Between Child Pornography and Child Molesting
Exact percentages vary, but experts have come to a general conclusion that there is in
fact some link between viewing child pornography and sexually molesting children. A study by
the New Zealand Internal Affairs suggested that there was “an association between viewing child
pornography and committing child sexual abuse.”41 A New York Times article in 2007
discussed a new controversial government study of convicted Internet offenders.42 The research
was carried out by psychologists at the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and found that many men who
claim to be “just looking at pictures” could, in fact, be predators.43 In the study, 155 male
inmates, all serving sentences for possession or distribution of child pornography, had
volunteered for the 18 month treatment program at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner,
N.C.44 More than 85 percent admitted to abusing at least one child, compared to the 26 percent
that were known to have done so at the time of sentencing.45 The psychologists who conducted
the study, Andres E. Hernandez and Michael L. Bourke, concluded that “many Internet child
pornography offenders may be undetected child molesters.”46 One convicted pedophile serving a

39

Candace Kim, From Fantasy to Reality: The Link Between Viewing Child Pornography and Molesting
Children, CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION UPDATE. VOL. 1(NO. 3) (2004), available at
http://www.ndaa.org/publications/newsletters/child_sexual_exploitation_update_volume_1_number_3_2004.html.
40
See Liu, supra note 13, at 9.
41
Archive of Statistics on Internet Dangers, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH (2006),
http://www.enough.org/inside.php?tag=stat%20archives# (citing Caroline Sullivan, Internet Traders of Child
Pornography: Profiling Research, NEW ZEALAND’S DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (October 2005),
http://www.dia.govt.nz/pubforms.nsf/URL/Profilingupdate2.pdf/$file/Profilingupdate2.pdf).
42
See Julian Sher and Benedict Carey, Debate on Child Pornography’s Link to Molesting, N.Y. TIMES (July 19,
2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/19/us/19sex.html?ref=childpornography.
43
See id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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14-year sentence said that viewing child pornography gave him no release from his desires, but
instead the exact opposite, furthering the sentiment that some men convicted of sexually abusing
children had their urges fueled by child pornography.47 The pedophile was interviewed and
quoted as saying:
[T]here is no way I can look at a picture of a child on a video screen and not get
turned on by that and want to do something about it. I knew that in my mind. I
knew that in my heart. I didn’t want it to happen, but it was going to happen.48
Although that controversial study put the number at 85 percent, most other studies have
put the correlation rate in the 40 percent range. “Forty percent of people charged with child
pornography also sexually abuse children. But finding the predators and identifying the victims
are daunting tasks.”49 A 2000 study issued by the Federal Bureau of Prisons found that “76
percent of offenders convicted of internet-related crimes against children admitted to contact sex
crimes with children previously undetected by law enforcement and had an average of 30.5 child
sex victims each.”50 According to the Mayo Clinic of the U.S.A., studies and case reports put
that correlation rate between child pornography and child molesting between 30 and 80
percent.51 During one study, the majority of men who had been charged with or convicted of
child pornography offenses showed pedophilic profiles on phallometric testing.52

47

See Sher & Carey, supra note 42.
Id.
49
Archive of Statistics on Internet Dangers, supra note 41 (citing Reuters, 2003).
50
Kim, supra note 39 (citing Internet Child Pornography: Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Michael J. Heimbach, Crimes
Against Children Unit, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI)).
51
See Ryan C.W. Hall and Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of Offenders,
Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS (Apr. 2007),
http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.com/content/82/4/457.full.
52
See Michael C. Seto, James M. Cantor, and Ray Blanchard, Child Pornography Offenses Are a Valid Diagnostic
Indicator of Pedophilia. JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 115.3 (2006): 610-15. “Phallometric testing.
Clinicians and researchers use phallometry to quantify the sexual interests of sexual offenders against children (e.g.,
Howes, 1995). A meta-analytic review of 61 sex offender follow-up studies found that phallometrically assessed
sexual arousal to children was the strongest predictor of subsequent sexual offenses among all the variables that
were examined (Hanson & Bussie`re, 1998). The specific protocol in use at the Kurt Freund Laboratory over the
48
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Our results indicate that child pornography offending is a valid diagnostic
indicator of pedophilia. Child pornography offenders were significantly more
likely to show a pedophilic pattern of sexual arousal during phallometric testing
than were comparison groups of offenders against adults or general sexology
patients. In fact, child pornography offenders, regardless of whether they had a
history of sexual offenses against child victims, were more likely to show a
pedophilic pattern of sexual arousal than were a combined group of offenders
against children. Our results suggest that child pornography offending might be a
stronger indicator of pedophilia than is sexually offending against a child.53
A 1987 report by the U.S.A. National Institute of Justice said that there was a “disturbing
correlation” between viewing child pornography and sexually abusing children.54
From January 1997 through March 2004, 620 of the 1,807 child pornographers that were
arrested, approximately 34 percent, were confirmed child molesters.55 The United States Postal
Inspection Service, which compiles data based upon evidence derived from child pornography
crime scene investigations and police reports, found that at least 80 percent of purchasers of child
pornography were active abusers and nearly 40 percent of the child pornographers investigated
during the last few years had sexually molested children in the past.56 Internet Crimes Against
Children (ICAC) task forces in states such as Pennsylvania and Texas found that 51 percent and
32 percent, respectively, of individuals that were arrested for viewing child pornography were
also molesting children, or had done so in the past, further confirming “the positive correlation
between the possession of child pornography and the commission of crimes against children.”57
Sexual predators will use child pornography as a means of assisting them in the grooming
course of the present investigation reliably distinguishes pedophilic from teleiophilic men (i.e., men who prefer
sexually mature persons). Blanchard et al. (2001) have described the phallometric testing procedure and data
preparation in detail. Briefly, a computer records penile blood volume while the patient observes a standardized set
of stimuli that depict persons of potential sexual interest. Changes in penile blood volume (i.e., his degree of penile
erection) indicate his relative sexual interest in each stimulus category.” Id. at 611.
53
Id. at 613.
54
See “Remarks of Arnold I Burns Before the Florida Law Enforcement Committee on Obscenity, Organized Crime
and Child Pornography”. NCJ 109133. National Institute of Justice. 1987-12-03.
55
See Kim, supra note 39.
56
See Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children and the Constitution: Before the Senate Comm. On the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Ernie Allen, Director, The National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children).
57
Kim, supra note 39.
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process, helping break down the child’s barriers to sexual behavior, making the child feel at ease,
and additionally communicating the predator’s sexual fantasies to the child.58 Child
pornography, while reinforcing fantasies, is often a precursor to acting out with real children,
where “[m]any pedophiles acknowledge that exposure to child abuse fuels their sexual fantasies
and plays an important part in leading them to commit hands-on sexual offenses against
children.”59 Evidence suggests that it is only a small leap from viewing child pornography to
molesting children, and “[i]n light of the documented link between . . . [the two,] each child
pornography case should be viewed as a red flag to the possibility of actual child molestation.”60
Although no one can agree on the exact percentage of individuals that view child
pornography and also sexually molest children, it seems that almost everyone agrees that some
correlation does in fact exist. This type of correlation falls under the category of indirect harm, a
category of harm that the government has a compelling interest in preventing, as found by the
Court in Ferber and again in Osborne v. Ohio.61 However, although the Court in Ferber
discusses both direct and indirect harms caused by the production and distribution of child
pornography, it acted inconsistently when discussing the difference between actual and virtual
child pornography. “Unfortunately, the Court did not consistently hold to its restriction against
virtual child pornography. Instead it seemed to create a loophole through which virtual child
pornography could escape the prohibition.”62 While at one point, the Court acknowledges the
importance of preventing children from both direct and indirect harm, at another point the Court
basically says that virtual child pornography could be utilized as a legal alternative to actual
58

See Kim, supra note 39 (Grooming is the gradual process by which child molesters build trust with the child to
transition from a nonsexual relationship to a sexual relationship. This is accomplished by seeking out, befriending,
and manipulating a target, and seducing the child with attention, affection and gifts.).
59
John Carr, Child Abuse, Child Pornography and the Internet: Executive Summary (NCH 2004).
60
Kim, supra note 39.
61
In Osborne, the Court found that “pedophiles use child pornography to seduce . . . children into sexual activity.”
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
62
Liu, supra note 13, at 10.
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child pornography, even though virtual child pornography causes the same indirect harms to
children as its real-life counterparts.63 “[T]he Supreme Court closed the front door to keep
virtual pornography out; but at the same time, it opened the back door to let it in.”64 In order to
combat this loophole created by the Supreme Court in Ferber, Congress passed the Child
Pornography Protection Act (CPPA) of 1996.
III. THE CPPA AND RELATED CASES
A. The CPPA
For the last several decades, “Congress has been trying to eliminate the scourge of child
pornography. Each time Congress passes a law, child pornographers find a way around the law’s
prohibitions. This cycle recently repeated itself and prompted Congress to enact the CPPA.”65
In enacting the CPPA, Congress attempted “to close loopholes in our Federal child pornography
laws caused by advances in our computer technology,”66 by banning visual depictions that
“appear[ ] to be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” or that are “advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that
the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”67
The CPPA covered actual child pornography, morphed child pornography, child pornography
made by using youthful-looking adults, and wholly computer-generated virtual child
pornography. In enacting the CPPA, Congress included thirteen detailed legislative findings that
gave its explanation for why it was imperative that virtual child pornography be prohibited.68
Congress found it to be a compelling governmental interest to protect children from direct harm,
63

See Liu, supra note 13, at 10 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763). “[I]f it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a
person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized. Simulation outside of the prohibition
of the statute could provide another alternative.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763.
64
Liu, supra note 13, at 10.
65
Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1098 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
66
Liu, supra note 13, at 15 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-338, at 28 (2006) (Additional Views of Senator Biden)).
67
Reno, 198 F.3d at 1098 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2256(8)(B), (d) (West Supp. 1999)).
68
See id.
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such as found in actual child pornography in Ferber, as well as indirect harm produced by actual
or virtual child pornography.
B. The Constitutionality of the CPPA
1. Circuit Court Decisions
After Congress passed the CPPA, four Federal Circuit Courts upheld the constitutionality
of it. However, the Ninth Circuit in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno held it to be
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.
In 1999, the First Circuit in United States v. Hilton, applied strict scrutiny in reviewing
the CPPA, and held that the government had a compelling interest in protecting children from
both direct and indirect harm.69 The Court in Hilton observed that “the legislative record . . .
[makes it] plain that the [CPPA] was intended to target only a narrow class of images–visual
depictions ‘which are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers’”70 from actual child
pornography. The Court found that virtual child pornography, similar to actual child
pornography, had little, if any social value, yet “[t]he government’s interest in addressing these
forms of child pornography is no less powerful than in instances where an actual child is actually
used and abused during the production process.”71 The Court in Hilton found that although there
might be some illegitimate applications of the CPPA, the “existence of a few possibly
impermissible applications of the Act does not warrant its condemnation . . . [and w]hatever
overbreadth may exist at the edges are more appropriately cured through a more precise case-bycase evaluations of the facts in a given case.”72 The Court stressed the fact that there was an
affirmative defense available in scenarios where the CPPA might be impermissibly applied, and

69

See Liu, supra note 13, at 16.
United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 72 (1999) (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-358, pt. 1, p. 7 (1996)).
71
Id. at 73.
72
Liu, supra note 13, at 17.
70

13

therefore, it was not substantially overbroad.73 It also held that the CPPA was not
unconstitutionally vague, finding that the “appears to be” standard was not purely subjective but
instead was an objective standard: “[a] jury must decide, based on the totality of the
circumstances whether an unsuspecting viewer would consider the depiction to be an actual
individual under the age of eighteen engaging in sexual activity.”74 Furthermore, the Court
found an additional safeguard against arbitrary prosecutions, in that “[t]he element of scienter . . .
must be satisfied by the prosecution before a valid conviction may be obtained – for instance, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual ‘knowingly’ possessed the
child pornography,”75 and this scienter requirement “extends to both the sexually explicit nature
of the material and the to the age of the performers.”76 As such, the Court came to the
conclusion that “the statute’s provisions ‘suitably limit’ the reach of the Act so that a person of
ordinary intelligence can easily discern likely unlawful conduct and conform his or her conduct
appropriately.”77
That same year the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Acheson also upheld the CPPA.
It found that “the CPPA’s overbreadth is minimal when viewed in light of its plainly legitimate
sweep,” and that the ‘appears to be’ language does not impermissibly expand “the scope of the
CPPA to the point where it captures so much constitutionally protected conduct as to render the
statute invalid.”78 The Court found that the “appears to be” language only targeted images that
were “virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from unretouched photographs of
73

See Liu, supra note 13, at 17. The CPPA provided an affirmative defense which allowed defendants to avoid
conviction by showing that the materials in question were produced using only adult subjects, and were not
distributed in a manner conveying the impression that they depicted real children. This defense did not apply to
morphed child pornography (see infra p. 39) or wholly computer-generated virtual child pornography. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(A)(c) (2000) (amended 2003).
74
Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75.
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actual children engaging in explicitly sexual conduct,”79 and found that the suggestion in Ferber
(that youthful-looking adults or simulations could be used as a legal alternative) should not be
given much weight because the Ferber Court had also found virtual child pornography to be of
“exceedingly modest, if not de minimis,” value and as such was unlikely to “constitute an
important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work.”80 The
Court agreed with the court in Hilton, that any potential overbreadth that may exist could be
“cured through case-by-case analysis.”81 The Court also agreed with the court in Hilton that the
scienter requirement protected against unscrupulous enforcement, in that “[i[f the government
could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the charged person ‘knowingly receives or
distributes’ or ‘knowingly possesses’ materials prohibited by the Act, then the statute did not
apply,”82 and concluded “that the CPPA passed the void-for-vagueness test.”83
The following year, in United States v. Mento, the Fourth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to
the CPPA and held that there was a compelling governmental interest in protecting children from
sexual exploitation resulting from child pornography84, and recognized the fact that virtual child
pornography produced “the same negative effects on minors” as actual child pornography.85 The
Court agreed with both the Hilton and Acheson courts in that the Act was not constitutionally
overbroad, for the “appears to be” language “prohibited only those images that were virtually
indistinguishable from real child pornography,”86 and did “not outlaw items such as drawings,
cartoons, or paintings.”87 The Court noted that when virtual child pornography “cannot be easily
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distinguished from the real thing . . . [it does] not deserve the protections of the First
Amendment, because ‘like sexually explicit material produced with actual children, there is little,
if any social value in this type of expression.”88 The Court agreed with both the Hilton and
Acheson courts and found that the CPPA was neither overbroad nor void for vagueness.
The year after Mento was decided, the CPPA was once again brought up in United States
v. Fox. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the three courts above and found the Act to be neither
overbroad nor void for vagueness. The Court referred to both Ferber and Osborne and held that
regulation of virtual child pornography was justified due to its indirect harm to children.89 The
Court noted that the Osborne court had discussed not only the direct harm caused to minors who
are used as subjects in child pornography, but also the indirect harm posed to future children
when such pornography is used to seduce or coerce them into sexual activity, and that “[i]t
makes no difference to the children coerced by such materials, or to the adult who employs them
to lure children into sexual activity, whether the subjects depicted are actual children or
computer simulations of children.”90 Virtual child pornography fuels the child pornography
market, and “the Ferber court expressly endorsed the destruction of . . . [this] market as a
justification of banning sexually explicit images of children.”91
In the same year that Hilton and Achelson was decided, the Ninth Circuit split with the
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits on the constitutionality of the CPPA in Free Speech
Coalition v. Reno.92 Like the other courts, the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny93, but found
the Act to be unconstitutional on three grounds. The Court found that the government did not
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have a compelling interest in banning virtual child pornography94, and held the Act to be
unconstitutionally overbroad95 and unconstitutionally vague96. Unlike the other four Circuit
courts, the Court in Reno interpreted Ferber as legitimizing only one kind of compelling
government interest – the direct harm caused to children who are subjects of child
pornography.97 The Court in Reno did not recognize the fact that virtual child pornography
could cause indirect harm to future children who are seduced by pedophiles, instead finding that
“factual studies that established the link between computer-generated child pornography and the
subsequent sexual abuse of children do not yet exist.”98 The Ninth Circuit felt that without
containing visual images of actual children, there was no compelling governmental interest in
regulating virtual child pornography99 and thus, found the CPPA to be invalid on its face.
C. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
After the Reno court found the CPPA to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and decided Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition in 2002. The Supreme Court sided with
the Ninth Circuit and found the CPPA to be unconstitutional.100 In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court
recognized the fact that “[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act
repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people.”101 Because of this, Congress is allowed to
pass valid laws to protect children from abuse; however, “the prospect of crime . . . by itself does
not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”102 Although the freedom of speech is one of our
most fundamental rights, it does have its limits; certain categories such as defamation,
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incitement, obscenity, and actual pornography are not embraced.103 The Court found that none
of those categories included the speech that was prohibited by the CPPA, and held that the CPPA
goes beyond both Ferber and Miller. “The CPPA . . . extends to images that appear to depict a
minor engaging in sexually explicit activity without regard to the Miller requirements,”104 and
“applies to a picture in a psychology manual, as well as a movie depicting the horrors of sexual
abuse.”105 The Court said that the CPPA prohibited speech without regard to its literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.106
The Court held that under the CPPA’s literal terms, works such as Shakespeare’s Romeo
and Juliet would fall within the statute’s prohibitions.107 Academy Award winning movies such
as Traffic and American Beauty “explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute’s
prohibitions,” regardless of whether or not they violate the CPPA.108 It is the Court’s view that if
any of the hundreds of films or other literary works that explore these subjects “contain even a
single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the
film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work’s redeeming value.”
According to the Court, this is not consistent with the First Amendment rule that “[t]he artistic
merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene,” and because of that,
“[t]he CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity . . . . [I]t lacks the required link between its
prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the definition of obscenity.”109
The Government tried to address this deficiency by arguing that the only speech that the
CPPA prohibited was speech that was “virtually indistinguishable” from child pornography,
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which could be banned “without regard to whether it depicts works of value.”110 However, the
Court found that the State had an interest in stamping out images without regard to any judgment
about its content only in circumstances where the images were themselves the product of child
abuse, as in Ferber.111 The statute in Ferber targeted the production of the work, not the work’s
contents. “The fact that a work contained serious literary, artistic, or other value did not excuse
the harm it caused to its child participants.”112 In Ferber, the prohibited speech had a “proximate
link” to the crime from which it came.113
The Court in Ashcroft discussed Osborne and recognized that Osborne had noted “the
State’s interest in preventing child pornography from being used as an aid in the solicitation of
minors.”114 However the Court felt that Osborne had “anchored its holding in the concern for
the participants, those whom it called the ‘victims of child pornography,’” and that absent direct
harm, indirect harm alone would not suffice.115 The CPPA prohibited speech that created no
victim in its production and recorded no crime, unlike the speech in Ferber which was the record
of child sexual abuse.116 The Court found that virtual child pornography was not “intrinsically
related” to the sexual abuse of children, and that while images can lead to instances of actual
child abuse, “the causal link is contingent and indirect.”117 Unlike in Ferber, where the harm
follows from the speech, here it “depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent
criminal acts.”118
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The Government found those indirect harms to be sufficient, citing Ferber’s
acknowledgement that child pornography can rarely be valuable speech, but the Court found two
flaws in that argument.119 The first flaw was that the Ferber court decided the way it did based
on how the child pornography was made, not on the message that it communicated, something
the Court stresses several times throughout its holding.120 “The case reaffirmed that where the
speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection
of the First Amendment.”121 Secondly, Ferber recognized that some works in the category of
child pornography might have significant value, and it relied on virtual images as an “alternative
and permissible means of expression.”122 It not only made the distinction between actual and
virtual child pornography, but it relied on it as a reason for its holding, and as such it “provides
no support for a statute that eliminates the distinction and makes the alternative mode criminal as
well.”123
The Supreme Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with both Miller and Ferber, and
found no weight in the Government’s other justifications. The Government argued four other
reasons for why the CPPA was necessary. First, pedophiles can use virtual child pornography to
seduce children.124 However, the Court found this concern no different than other innocent
things that could be used for immoral purposes, such as cartoons, video games, and candy.125
The Court said the government could of course punish these pedophiles for providing unsuitable
materials to children, but that the Government “cannot ban speech fit for adults simply because it

119

See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250.
See id. at 251.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See id.
125
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251.
120

20

may fall into the hands of children.”126 In the case of using virtual child pornography to seduce
children, the evil is dependent upon the actor’s unlawful conduct, conduct “defined as criminal
quite apart from any link to the speech in question.”127 The Court found that the CPPA went
well beyond the interest in prohibiting illegal conduct “by restricting the speech available to lawabiding adults.”128
Secondly, the Government contended that virtual child pornography “whets the appetites
of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct,”129 a sentiment that Congress
had included in its Congressional findings following the passage of the CPPA. But the Court
rejected that argument and held that the Government could not “constitutionally premise
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”130 “The mere tendency
of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”131 In the Court’s
view, the Government did not show that the speech in question incited or produced imminent
lawless action, as required under Brandenburg v. Ohio132, and as such the Government could not
“prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some
indefinite future time.’”133
For its third justification, the Government argued that virtual child pornography needed
to be prohibited in order to help eliminate the market for pornography produced using real
children.134 The Government found that virtual images are indistinguishable from real ones, and
as such could be traded with pedophiles for actual child pornography, further fueling the market
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for child pornography. However, the Court found this to be implausible. Instead, it felt that “[i]f
virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be driven
from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes [and f]ew pornographers would risk
prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice.”135 Unlike
Ferber, where the creation of the speech was itself the crime of child abuse, here the Court said
there was no underlying crime at all, and as a result the Government’s market deterrence theory
did not justify this statute.136
Finally, the Government argued that the “possibility of producing images by using
computer imaging makes it very difficult for it to prosecute those who produce pornography by
using real children.”137 Experts can have a difficult time determining whether the pictures were
produced using actual children or by using computer imaging, and so the Government argued
that both kinds of images needed to be prohibited.138 Rather than interpreting the CPPA as a
measure suppressing speech, the Government wanted the Court to read the CPPA as a law that
shifts the burden to the accused to prove the speech is not unlawful, and relied on an affirmative
defense under the statute.139 This affirmative defense “allows a defendant to avoid conviction
for nonposession offenses by showing that the materials were produced using only adults and
were not otherwise distributed in a manner conveying the impression that they depicted real
children.”140 The Court likened the Government’s final argument to essentially an argument that
says protected speech should be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech.141 This, the Court
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says, turns the First Amendment upside down.142 Protected speech does not lose First
Amendment protection simply because it resembles unprotected speech; instead the opposite is
true. “[T]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted,”143 and
consequently the Government is prohibited “from banning unprotected speech if a substantial
amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.”144 The Court also found the
affirmative defense to be incomplete and insufficient, leaving unprotected “a substantial amount
of speech not tied to the Government’s interest in distinguishing images produced using real
children from virtual ones.”145
The Supreme Court found that the CPPA covered materials beyond the recognized
categories in Ferber and Miller, and that it abridged the freedom to engage in a substantial
amount of lawful speech.146 As a result, it held that the CPPA was overbroad and
unconstitutional.147
IV. THE COURT IN ASHCROFT GOT IT WRONG
In holding that the CPPA was unconstitutional, the Court in Ashcroft got it wrong for
several reasons. In 1995, Congress opined that apparent child pornography was equally as
dangerous as real child pornography, yet technology back then was not even a fraction of what it
is today. Justice Thomas conceded in his concurring opinion in Ashcroft, that “technology may
evolve to the point where it becomes impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws
because the Government cannot prove that certain pornographic images are of real children.”148
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Thomas was of the opinion that if advances in technology thwarted prosecution of “unlawful
speech,” then “the Government may well have a compelling interest in barring or otherwise
regulating some narrow category of ‘lawful speech’ in order to enforce effectively laws against
pornography made through the abuse of real children.’”149 This future time period that Justice
Thomas speaks of is upon us now. It has been nine years since the Court decided Ashcroft, and
in that time technology has improved tenfold. At the time of Ashcroft’s decision, Congress had
evidence demonstrating “that technology already exists to disguise depictions of real children to
make them unidentifiable and to make depictions of real children appear computer-generated.
The technology will soon exist, if it does not already, to computer generate realistic images of
children.”150 Almost a decade ago, Congress correctly predicted that technology would soon
exist that was capable of creating life-like and realistic images of children. One need not look
any further than Hollywood and the video game industry to see how far our CGI technology has
come.
The Court in Ashcroft disregarded most of the Congressional findings that were filed with
the CPPA. The Court instead decided that if virtual pornography was as indistinguishable from
actual pornography as Congress said it was, then no pornographer would ever risk prosecution
by abusing real children when creating virtual ones would suffice. But much as the Court felt
about the Government’s market deterrence theory, it is in fact the Court’s judgment that is highly
implausible. For one, it relies on a “false assumption of pragmatic rationality. The opinion
assumes that child pornographers are pragmatically rational.”151 But this is a false assumption,
for no pragmatically rational person would use or create child pornography in the first place.
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The Court was mistaken as to the reasons and motivations behind producing actual child
pornography.
Child pornography results from the abuse of real children by sex offenders; the
production of child pornography is a byproduct of, and not the primary reason
for, the sexual abuse of children. There is no evidence that the future
development of easy and inexpensive means of computer generating realistic
images of children would stop or even reduce the sexual abuse of real children or
the practice of visually recording that abuse.152
The Ashcroft Court essentially decided that if a child pornographer could choose between
abusing a child and digitally creating a virtual one, he would almost always choose the latter. “If
virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography . . . few pornographers would risk
prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice.”153 But
this is a baseless assumption. “[M]any experts on child molesters explain that these individuals
derive sexual gratification from the pain inflicted on actual children, and the recording of it.
These producers of child pornography would not be interested in virtual pornography.”154 Child
pornographers do not abuse children for the primary goal of making child pornography. Instead,
abusing children is an activity that child molesters like to take part in. Recording that abuse is
something else that they like to do. Being given an alternative means of creating child
pornography would not make a child molester stop abusing children. This argument that the
Supreme Court puts forth is akin to saying the following: a boy likes to skateboard with his
friends; he enjoys filming himself perform skateboard tricks; he then likes to go on the computer
and trade his videos with other skateboarders to view their videos and enjoy. If at some point
technology came around where it was easy and efficient to produce those same skateboarding
videos, but without actually having to skateboard, it is the Court’s opinion that that boy, and
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others like him, would almost always choose that alternative method. But the Court is missing
the main point: the boy likes to skateboard, so even if he was given another means of producing a
skateboarding video, he still is going to skateboard. The same logic follows with child
molesters. Child molesters have a propensity to molest children, and they derive pleasure from
recording that abuse, so even if they are given another means of producing videos of children
being sexually molested, they are still going to want to molest children.
Another reason for why Ashcroft was incorrectly decided was that the Court’s reasoning
was inconsistent with Osborne and Ferber because the Court in Ashcroft changed its view on
indirect harm. In Osborne, the Court found that pedophiles will sometimes use child
pornography to help seduce other children into sexual activity. Therefore it recognized the fact
that there were two types of harms stemming from child pornography: direct and indirect. The
Osborne Court was aware that child pornography not only caused direct harm to the children
who were used as subjects in the pornographic material, but also caused indirect harm to other
children. It “indicated that protecting children who are not actually pictured in the pornographic
image is a legitimate and compelling state interest.”155 The Court in Ferber admitted to there
being an “intrinsic relationship” between child pornography and indirect harm to children, and
held that “[t]he distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.”156 Yet in Ashcroft, the Court changed its
stance and found that indirect harm caused to children did not suffice as a compelling state
interest for banning virtual child pornography.
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Virtual child pornography is by definition virtually indistinguishable from actual child
pornography. Therefore, the CPPA would not cover materials such as Romeo and Juliet, or
Traffic, or American Beauty, or everyday artistic expressions like paintings, drawings, and
sculptures that depict youthful looking subjects in a sexual manner, something that the majority
in Ashcroft seems to think is very probable. In his dissent in Reno, Judge Ferguson felt that it
was important to consider the findings that Congress had filed with the CPPA. In them,
“Congress repeatedly stated that the law is targeted at visual depictions that are ‘virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct’”157 and that the language in the statute covers
“the same type of photographic images already prohibited, but which do[ ] not require the use of
an actual minor.”158 As the Court in Hilton said, “drawings, cartoons, sculptures, and paintings
depicting youthful persons in sexually explicit poses plainly lie beyond the Act [because b]y
definition they would not be ‘virtually indistinguishable’ from an image of an actual minor.”159
The CPPA simply extends the prohibitions that already exist on actual child pornography to a
narrow class of computer-generated images that could easily be mistaken as real children, and
therefore contrary to what the Court in Ashcroft believes, the “CPPA . . . does not pose a threat to
the vast majority of every day artistic expression, even to speech involving sexual themes.”160
Further, the chill felt by the majority, that “few legitimate movie producers . . . would risk
distributing images in or near the uncertain reach of this law,” was never actually felt by those
who make movies.161 Movies such as Traffic and American Beauty won their Academy Awards
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in 2001 and 2000, respectively; yet, the CPPA had been on the books, and had been enforced,
since 1996.162 Clearly, the CPPA did not discourage or prevent those movie producers from
making their movies.
Because virtual child pornography is virtually indistinguishable from actual child
pornography, it follows then that it causes the same indirect harm to children as actual child
pornography does. “Thus, if the prevention of child pornography’s indirect harm suffices to be a
compelling government interest [something the Court recognized in both Ferber and Osborne],
the prevention of the indirect harm caused by virtual child pornography also suffices.”163
However, to reconcile the difference in its opinions, the Ashcroft Court denied that it had ever
held indirect harm to be a compelling interest in Ferber, consequentially denying that the
protection of children from virtual child pornography is a compelling interest.164 “In order to
serve its purpose of invalidating the CPPA, the Court changed its position from Ferber and
Osborne to Ashcroft without admitting the change.”165
The Court in Ashcroft failed to see the similarities between virtual and actual child
pornography and the indirect harm it can cause. Unfortunately it did not give enough weight to
the dangers that virtual child pornography can pose. First of all, viewing child pornography
stimulates pedophiles and causes them to go out looking for actual child victims. Pedophiles
view the child pornography and then want to commit similar acts on real children. Secondly,
pedophiles often use the child pornography to seduce those other children into sexual activity.
This is something that Congress stressed heavily in its findings accompanying the CPPA, in part
relying on what the Court said in Osborne. When a child views a video of a similarly-aged child
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engaging in sexual activity with an adult, the child sees this activity as being acceptable and thus
is more willing to engage in sexual acts with the pedophile. These pedophiles are using this
child pornography in order to make the child feel comfortable in turning their relationship into a
sexual one. What the Court in Ashcroft failed to understand is that from the perspective of the
child, he could care less whether the image is of a real or virtual person. To the child, it makes
no difference. That is not to say that if a pedophile was using a cartoon such as Spongebob
Squarepants to seduce a child, that Spongebob should now be prohibited. But Congress found
that “when child pornography is ‘used as a means of seducing or breaking down a child’s
inhibitions,’ the images are equally effective regardless of whether they are real photographs or
computer-generated pictures that are ‘virtually indistinguishable.’”166 Bruce Taylor, Chief
Counsel for the National Law Center for Children and Families, stated during the Hearings
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1995 that “real and apparent [child pornography] . . .
are equally dangerous because both have . . . the same seductive effect on a child victim.”167 The
children that are being molested by pedophiles can range anywhere from the age of one to a prepubescent child. Obviously, if a pedophile were to victimize a one-year old, he would not need
child pornography to seduce that child. But that does not necessarily make the dangers of child
pornography fall by the wayside, for the fact remains that the child pornography is still making
that child molester want to go out and seek future victims in the first place.
As virtual child pornography becomes more and more life-like, it can be used to promote
the market for child pornography, the destruction of which is something that the Court
specifically recognized as a legitimate interest in Osborne and Ferber. Congress, in enacting the
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CPPA, stated that the statute would “encourage people to destroy all forms of child pornography,
thereby reducing the market for the material.”168 Contrary to what the Court believes in
Ashcroft, “persons who trade and sell images that are indistinguishable from those of actual
children engaged in sexual activity ‘keep the market for child pornography thriving.’”169
Pictures that look like children engaging in sexual activities can be exchanged for actual child
pornography, and thus, by “limiting the production and distribution of images that appear to be
of children having sex, the CPPA helps rid the market of all child pornography.”170 It is
“undoubtedly true” that “somewhere in this chain of computer-generated production there are
going to be real children . . . involved.”171
The majority in Ashcroft also failed to address Congress’ concern that “computerimaging technology is making it increasingly difficult in criminal cases for the government ‘to
meet its burden of proving that a pornographic image is of a real child.’”172
In the absence of congressional action, the difficulties in enforcing the child
pornography laws will continue to grow increasingly worse. The mere prospect
that the technology exists to create composite of computer-generated depictions
that are indistinguishable from depictions of real children will allow defendants
who possess images of real children to escape prosecution; for it threatens to
create a reasonable doubt in every case of computer images even when a real
child was abused. This threatens to render child pornography laws that protect
real children unenforceable. Moreover, imposing an additional requirement that
the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the
image was in fact a real child–as some courts have done–threatens to result in the
de facto legalization of the possession, receipt, and distribution of child
pornography for all except the original producers of the material.173
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In fact, in one case, United States v. Kimbrough, the defendant relied on advances in computer
technology in arguing that the government had failed to meet its “burden that each item of the
alleged child pornography did, in fact, depict an actual minor rather than an adult made to look
like one.”174 Although no defendant at the time of Ashcroft had ever successfully employed this
argument, “given the rapid pace of advances in computer-graphics technology, the Government’s
concern is reasonable.”175 Even in 2002, Justice O’Connor gave credence to the fact that
“[c]omputer-generated images lodged with the Court by amici curiae National Law Center for
Children and Families et al. bear a remarkable likeness to actual human beings.”176 The
Government’s concern becomes far more reasonable, given that computer-graphics technology
has advanced exponentially since Ashcroft was decided. As computer imaging software
progresses and defendants become able to use that in order to raise a “built-in reasonable doubt
argument in every child exploitation/pornography prosecution,” Congress felt it was necessary to
close this loophole using the CPPA. The majority in Ashcroft should have taken this into
consideration.177
The Ashcroft Court also failed to meet the contention that child pornography, whether
real or virtual, has little or no social value. There is no logical reason to treat virtual child
pornography differently than real child pornography. Virtual child pornography is not more
valued speech. “Both real and virtual child pornography contain visual depictions of children
engaging in sexually explicit activity. The only difference is that real child pornography uses
actual children in its production, whereas virtual child pornography does not.”178 Although this
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distinction is of some importance, it “does not somehow transfer virtual child pornography into
meaningful speech.”179
[T]he effect of visual depictions of child sexual activity on a child molester or
pedophile using that material to stimulate or whet his own sexual appetite, or on a
child where the material is being used as a means of seducing or breaking down
the child’s inhibitions to sexual abuse or exploitation, is the same whether the
child pornography . . . [is real child pornography, or virtual child pornography
that is] virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from photographic
images of actual children.180
Because the danger to the molested child is just as great when the child pornographer uses virtual
child pornography as when the material used consists of actual children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct, “[v]irtual child pornography, like its counterpart real child pornography, is of
‘slight social value’ and constitutes ‘no essential part of the exposition of ideas.’”181 Thus, the
Ashcroft Court should never have accorded virtual child pornography the full protection of the
First Amendment. Instead, it should have realized that “Congress’ interests in destroying the
child pornography market and in preventing the seduction of minors outweigh virtual child
pornography’s exceedingly modest social value.”182 “Since the balance of competing interests
tips in favor of the government,”183 virtual child pornography, like real child pornography,
should be as a class of speech outside the protection of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court in Ashcroft emphasized the fact that the speech prohibited by the
CPPA created no victim in its production and recorded no crime, and that the causal link
between virtual child pornography and the sexual abuse of children was contingent and indirect,
unlike the speech in Ferber that had a proximate link to the crime from which it came.184
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However, this causal link theory is “inadequate and unsupported by the Court’s prior cases.”185
It is inconsistent with First Amendment jurisprudence to restrict speech only if it records a crime.
As the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire held, fighting words could be regulated, “not
because they ‘record’ or have ‘caused’ an independent crime, but because doing so is necessary
to prevent a crime.”186 If we were to adopt the Court’s causal link theory, then fighting words
would never be regulated. While discussing actual causal link, the Court failed to recognize the
second type of causal link: potential. “Potential causal link stems from Justice Holmes’ clear and
present danger test.”187 It serves a preventative purpose, in that the speech can be regulated to
prevent the potential crime associated with that speech from happening. Justice O’Connor
recognized this potential causal link in her dissent, saying that “this Court’s cases do not require
Congress to wait for harm to occur before it can legislate against it.”188 In Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court said that “[a] fundamental principle of legislation is that Congress
is under no obligation to wait until the entire harm occurs but may act to prevent it.”189
Consequently, the fact that virtual child pornography does not record a crime or create a victim
does not imply that there is no causal link between virtual child pornography and the sexual
abuse of children. The CPPA helps prevent future crimes from occurring, and the Court in
Ashcroft should have given deference to Congress in determining that.
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V. USING BRANDENBURG V. OHIO AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF COMBATING VIRTUAL
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Traditionally, Courts have upheld laws banning child pornography because real children
were used in its production. Virtual child pornography upsets this traditional rationale because
no actual child actors are used in its creation. However, there is an alternative, and largely
unexplored, means of combating digital child pornography. A “more in-depth analysis shows
how virtual child pornography should still lack First Amendment protection under the ‘advocacy
of illegal conduct’ exception to free speech, [in that] . . . it incites imminent lawless action,
specifically whetting the appetites of pedophiles to seduce and harm real children.”190
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the defendant invited a news reporter to tape, and later replay on
the evening news, portions of a KKK rally that was filled with hateful remarks towards black
people and Jewish people.191 The Court in that case said that his speech was nothing more than a
mere advocacy of illegal conduct. The Court held that “where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action,”192
the speech will not be protected by the First Amendment. There is a strong argument to be made
that the CPPA’s ban of digital child pornography is constitutional under the Brandenburg
analysis.
Although never specifically mentioned by the Brandenburg Court, the “audience” of the
concerned speech has an effect on whether the speech is likely to incite imminent lawless action.
There is an argument to be made that it’s possible the Court did not think the defendant’s hateful
comments would incite lawless action on the part of the general public because there was a good
190

Justin Leach, Reacting to Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and the Burial of the CPPA: An Argument to
Regulate Digital Child Pornography Because It Incites Imminent Lawless Action, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 114
(2002).
191
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
192
Id. at 448.

34

chance that most of the television viewers did not share the same views and feelings of hatred as
the KKK leaders, and thus would not be incited to go out and harm black people and Jewish
people. Because the views expressed in the video were so radical, it was unlikely that it would
have any effect of “encouraging violence similar to that encouraged in the video, especially
among the general public.”193
In looking at the CPPA under the Brandenburg analysis, it becomes helpful to analogize
the facts of Brandenburg to the ban on digital child pornography. Unlike in Brandenburg, where
the “audience” was the general public, imagine if instead the “audience” was only members of
the KKK. Because the “audience” would share the same radical views and feelings of hatred as
the KKK leaders in the video, it is more likely that they would have been incited to go out and
harm black people and Jewish people. If that were the case, the Court most likely would have
found the speech in Brandenburg to be beyond just “mere advocacy of illegal conduct,” and
instead inciting imminent lawless action. Analogizing that to the CPPA’s ban on digital child
pornography, the “audience” in question here is very similar to the “audience” in the
hypothetical above.
In the case of digital child pornography, the “audience” is likely just made up of
pedophiles or other sexual abusers who know how to find child pornography on
the Web. Because the “audience” is made up specifically of the type of people
who are likely to take part in the crime depicted in the digital photographs, there
seems to be a much greater likelihood of “inciting imminent lawless action” than
if those photographs were shown to the general public over the nightly news like
in Brandenburg.194
Furthermore, where the video footage in Brandenburg only encouraged lawless action, the
material banned by the CPPA actually depicts lawless action taking place. So imagine then back
to our hypothetical above, if the video that was sent around to KKK members did not contain a
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speech by the KKK leaders encouraging lawless action, but instead showed digitally created
images of them killing or torturing blacks and Jews. Now imagine this resulted in the further
commission of those same digitally depicted acts perpetrated against real blacks and Jews.
“Under this scenario, it seems likely that the Court in Brandenburg would have considered the
advocacy of illegal conduct much more ‘imminent,’ such that the digital photographs depicting
violence toward blacks and Jews would not be protected by the First Amendment.”195 If the
speech that is banned by the CPPA was changed instead to look like the facts in Brandenburg, it
would be as such: pedophiles create, and distribute to the general public, a video of a speech
encouraging members of the public to go out and sexually molest children. Obviously, because a
majority of the population would not share in these feelings, and thus would not be incited to go
out and actually molest children, the Court would find that to be merely advocating illegal
conduct, and therefore constitutional under the First Amendment, like the speech in
Brandenburg. However, that is not the type of speech banned by the CPPA. It bans digitally
created material that portrays actual lawless action. Further, this material is being distributed
solely to an “audience” who shares the same radical feelings as the pedophiles in the videos.
Therefore, they are much more likely to be incited to go out and take part in the same acts
portrayed in the films. “[D]ue to the evidence suggesting that pedophiles use digital photographs
to ‘whet their appetites,’ there seems to be a strong argument that the CPPA’s ban on digital
child pornography should withstand First Amendment scrutiny.”196
Virtual child pornography incites several types of lawless action. These include
downloading, distributing, and sharing files of actual child pornography, and sexually molesting
actual children. As discussed earlier, virtual child pornography can be used to whet the appetite
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of pedophiles and fuel the market for actual child pornography. The Court in Osborne
recognized that child pornography was used by pedophiles to “seduce other children into
activity” by breaking down their inhibitions.197 “Congress found that child pornography can
have that effect, regardless of whether the pornography takes the form of computer-generated
images or photographs of real children.”198 “Clearly, one of the primary uses of child
pornography, and, thus virtual child pornography, is for the systematic desensitization, as part of
an insidious process, to induce children to engage in the acts depicted.”199 Congress also heard
evidence that often times pedophiles will exchange images of digitally created child pornography
for pictures of real children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.200 The Court in Hilton found,
as discussed above, that distributing virtual child pornography would encourage the production
of real child pornography, and believed that the main purpose of the CPPA was to deprive child
abusers of a “criminal tool” frequently used to facilitate the sexual abuse of children.201
In sum, as opposed to other forms of media that depict lawless action, but are distributed
to the general public, virtual child pornography is a depiction and encouragement of lawless
action that is presented to and sought out by a very narrow, specific audience that is likely to be
stimulated to react to it.202 The way pedophiles use digital child pornography is “likely to
incite”203 them to seduce and harm children. “Specifically, evidence that digital child
pornography ‘whets the appetite’ of pedophiles supports the conclusion that such images ‘incite
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imminent lawless action,’ causing pedophiles to be stimulated into action, resulting in harm to
real children.”204
VI. THE FUTURE OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE PROTECT ACT OF 2003
A. The PROTECT Act of 2003
In response the Supreme Court’s ruling that the CPPA was unconstitutional, many bills
were drafted by the Senate and House to address the issue. On April 10, 2003 the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act (herein
referred to as the Act) was passed by Congress and was signed by the president on April 30,
2003.205 The purpose of the Act was to further fight against virtual child pornography, while
addressing the deficiencies that the Court said existed in the CPPA.
One of the problems that the Ashcroft Court found with the CPPA was that the
affirmative defense provided for in § 2252A(c) – that the burden would shift to the defendant to
prove that the alleged child pornography was produced using an adult, and therefore that his
speech was not unlawful – was incomplete and insufficient on its own terms, in that it allowed
“persons to be convicted in some instances where they can prove children were not exploited in
the production [i.e., computer generated virtual minors].”206 The Act amended this section by
expanding the defense to include computer-generated child pornography. This affirmative
defense, however, still cannot be asserted with respect to “morphed” child pornography, as the
minor in those materials are real, not virtual. The statute defines “morphed” child pornography
as visual depictions that have “been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable
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minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”207 In other words, morphed child pornography
occurs when an innocent image of a real child is altered to depict something sexually explicit.
This is not virtual child pornography because “the minor is not virtual – only the pose is.”208 A
defendant would not be able to allege here that an adult was used in the image’s production or
that the image was computer generated. Therefore, the affirmative defense cannot be asserted
with regard to “morphed” child pornography.
The Act also made changes to § 2256(8)(B), one of the two sections that the Ashcroft
Court had found unconstitutionally overbroad. It replaced the language in § 2256(8)(B) from “is,
or appears to be of a minor” to “is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor.” The Act
defined “indistinguishable” in subsection (11) as such: “[indistinguishable] means virtually
indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction
would conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”209
The statute further goes on to note that the “definition does not apply to depictions that are
drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults,”210 something that was a
key concern for the Court in Ashcroft. In addition to changing the language in § 2256(8)(B), it
gave that subsection a new, somewhat narrower, definition of “sexually explicit conduct.” When
a real actual child is involved, “sexually explicit conduct” is defined by subsection (2)(A) as
“actual or simulated (i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or
oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation;
(iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
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person.”211 However for purposes of virtual child pornography as defined by § 2256(8)(B),
“sexually explicit conduct” is controlled by subsection (2)(B) which defines it as
(i) graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital,
or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or lascivious
simulated sexual intercourse where the genitals, breast, or pubic area of any
person is exhibited;
(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated: bestiality; masturbation; or sadistic or
masochistic abuse; or
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person.212
Thus, conduct that is sexually explicit under § 2256(2)(A) is only sexually explicit under
subsection (2)(B) if it is lascivious.
The Act deleted § 2256(8)(D), the second of the two sections that the Court in Ashcroft
had found unconstitutionally overbroad, which had defined child pornography as “a visual
depiction advertised, promoted, presented, described or distributed in such a manner that conveys
the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct.”213 It moved the “pandering” language to a revised § 2252A(a)(3)(B), which
would find someone guilty if he
(3) knowingly . . .
(B) advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any
material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is
intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or
contains—
(i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
or
(ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.214

211

18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(2)(A) (West).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(2)(B) (West).
213
18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(D) (West) (emphasis added).
214
18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (West) (emphasis added).
212

40

This replaced the “conveys the impression” language from subsection (8)(D) of the CPPA with
the more narrowly circumscribed “in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause
another to believe” language of § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
The Act also added a new subsection to § 2252A. Subsection (a)(6) prohibits
“knowingly distributing, etc., a visual depiction to a minor where such visual depiction is, or
appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, for purposes of inducing or
persuading a minor to participate in any activity that is illegal.”215 This includes virtual child
pornography; i.e. if virtual child pornography was distributed to a minor for purposes of inducing
or persuading the minor to participate in an illegal activity, that would be in violation of §
2252A(a)(6). This is consistent with what Justice Kennedy said in Ashcroft, that “‘[t]he
Government . . . may punish adults who provide unsuitable materials to children,’ citing
Ginsberg v. New York [390 U.S. 629 (1967)].”216
The Act also added § 1466A, which was later held to be unconstitutional by the Court in
U.S. v. Handley, 564 F.Supp.2d 996 (2008).
B. United States v. Williams
In 2008, the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act’s pandering provision was addressed
in United States v. Williams. The defendant, after posting links of child pornography in a public
Internet chat room, was charged with one count of pandering child pornography under §
2252A(a)(3)(B) and one count of possessing child pornography under § 2252A(a)(5)(B)217. He
challenged the pandering provision, which was added under the PROTECT Act, discussed supra.
This section was added by Congress because it “was concerned that limiting the childpornography prohibition to material that could be proved to feature actual children . . . would
215
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enable many child pornographers to evade conviction.”218 Congress felt that with new
technology and pictures being repeatedly transmitted over the internet, it could make it almost
impossible to prove that a particular picture was produced with real children as the subjects.219
The pandering statute promulgated in PROTECT differs from the statutes that were
covered in Ferber, Osborne, and Ashcroft, in that it does not target the underlying material, but
instead “bans the collateral speech that introduces such material into the child-pornography
distribution network.”220 Therefore if a person possesses virtual child pornography, which is
allowed under Ashcroft, but advertises it as depicting actual children, he violates the statute.221
The Court in Williams concluded that the words in the pandering statute that dealt with
transactions, did not just relate to commercial transactions, but in many cases could be “carried
out by individual amateurs who seek no financial reward. To run afoul of the statute, the speech
need only accompany or seek to induce the transfer of child pornography from one person to
another.”222 Because the statute was not limited to commercial transactions, the Court subjected
“the content-based restriction of the PROTECT Act pandering provision to strict scrutiny.”223
The Williams Court noted as a rationale for the statute “the principle that offers to give or
receive what it is unlawful to possess have no social value and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no
First Amendment protection.”224 In other words, because it is unlawful to possess real child
pornography, it is also unlawful to offer to give or request to receive it. The Court distinguished
between a proposal to engage in illegal activity and the abstract advocacy of illegality. For
example, if someone went online and said “I think possessing child pornography should be legal
218
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because it is fun to look at,” this would merely be advocating child pornography. However, if he
then went on to say “I have images of actual child pornography, who wants to trade,” this would
be a proposal to engage in illegal activity. The Court found that the Act did “not prohibit
advocacy of child pornography, but only offers to provide or requests to obtain it.”225 This, the
Court said, fell well within constitutional bounds, unlike the pandering provision that was at
issue in Ashcroft, which the Court found to be constitutionally defective for going “beyond
pandering to prohibit possession of material that could not otherwise be proscribed.”226 The
Court held that “offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically
excluded from the First Amendment.”227 As long as the defendant “hold[s], and make[s] a
statement that reflects, the belief that the material is child pornography; or that he
communicate[s] in a manner intended to cause another so to believe,”228 his actions will
implicate the statute.
While the PROTECT Act makes the pandering of virtual child pornography as real child
pornography illegal, the Court made sure to note that its decision did not overrule Ashcroft. It in
no way provided Congress with an “end run around the First Amendment’s protection of virtual
child pornography by prohibiting proposals to transact in such images rather than prohibiting the
images themselves.”229 The Court stressed the fact that the statute did not prohibit the offer to
provide or request to receive virtual child pornography, so long as it was not being pandered as
containing actual children.
A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to
believe that the subject of the proposed transaction depicts real children. It is
simply not true that this means “a protected category of expression [will]
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inevitably be suppressed,” [ ]. Simulated child pornography will be as available
as ever, so long as it is offered and sought as such, and not as real child
pornography.230
While the PROTECT Act takes the right step forward, it unfortunately does not go far enough.
The Court in Williams held that the statute criminalizing the pandering or solicitation of child
pornography was not overbroad under the First Amendment, and was not impermissibly vague
under the Due Process Clause. Regrettably though, the Court still reiterated its holding in
Ashcroft that the mere possession of virtual child pornography is protected free speech under the
First Amendment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Technology in general seems to be advancing at an ever increasing speed. Computer
technology in particular has gotten to a point where it has become increasingly difficult to
differentiate between virtual images and their real-life counterparts. Although the Court in
Ashcroft found no compelling interests for prohibiting the possession of virtual child
pornography, due to technological advances in the nine years since that decision, the Court
would be wise to readdress the issue once more. As discussed above, virtual child pornography
poses just as much indirect harm to children as the harm posed by actual child pornography.
Although no real children are used in the production of digital child pornography, it can still be
used by pedophiles to harm future children. While the Court briefly touched on the subject in
Williams, where it upheld the pandering provision found in the PROTECT Act of 2003, it
unfortunately once again reaffirmed its position in Ashcroft, stating that so long as it is not
offered and sought as real child pornography, virtual child pornography would be protected
under the First Amendment and be “as available as ever.”231 If the Court truly feels that
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“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor”232 and preventing the
sexual exploitation and abuse of children “constitute[s] a government objective of surpassing
importance,”233 then it needs to overturn its decision in Ashcroft. The only way to close the
distribution network and dry up the market for child pornography is for the Court to no longer
distinguish between actual and virtual child pornography, but instead prohibit both. Just like real
child pornography, virtual child pornography has little to no social value, and thus has no place
in a society as advanced and civilized as ours. As such, the Court should classify virtual child
pornography as a category of material wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.
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